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(Word v. Kedgewin, no. 4, p. 8), and likewise Bordeaux, Brittany, and
Scotland could each be localized in London (id., no. 9, p. 14). An
identical pleading was upheld in Woodford v. Wyatt a year later
(Baker & Milsom, Sources of English Legal History, 2d ed., p. 494).
In another of Paynell's cases, Dunkirk was put "in the Ward of Cheap"
(Cremer v. Tookley, no. 262, p. 304). The lawyer Henry Calthorpe
revolted against what he called, twice, this "fictionary" remedy (p.
307)-the only time that this word has been found in published
nominate reports, and more than 250 years before the solitary cited
use of "fictionary" in the Oxford English Dictionary. The particular
fictitious pleading of a London, Middlesex, or Kent venue for a for-
eign place had been known at least since a Year Book report of 1440
(Y.B. Pasch. 20 Hen. 6, pl. 21, fol. 28b (Seipp No. 1442.042) and the
earlier Y.B. Hil. 48 Edw. 3, pl. 6, fol. 2b-3b (Seipp No. 1374.006)), but
lawyers had only been naming these devices "fictions of law" (fic-
tionejuris) since about 1590, most frequently in Edward Coke's re-
ports. Paynell's reports add a bit to the story of that characteristic
peculiarity of English common law, the legal fiction.
Translation is hard work, and tracking down thousands of cita-
tions and cross-references is a labor of devotion to our collective
scholarly endeavor that deserves every legal historian's praise. Pro-
fessor Bryson is to be congratulated for this excellent translation
and scholarly edition of an important set of reports. Now let us get
this online and searchable.
DAVID J. SEIPP
Boston University
MARTHA CHAMALLAS and JENNIFER WRIGGINS. The Measure of In-
jury: Race, Gender, and Tort Law. New York: New York University
Press, 2010. 288 pp. $40.00 (cloth).
The Measure of Injury: Race, Gender, and Tort Law, by Martha
Chamallas and Jennifer Wriggins, is a comprehensive analysis of tort
law written from a feminist perspective. In its range and depth, it is
a stunning achievement.
Tort doctrine evolved over many centuries as part of a common
law system of adjudicating private disputes. History tells us that the
adjudicators of these disputes were white men of a certain class
who lived in societies where gender, race, and class were crucially
important categories. We would therefore expect to see traces of
sexism, racism, and classism reflected in tort doctrine. Nevertheless,
on the surface, these problems are not readily apparent. With the
exception of a few outgrown doctrines, modern tort law appears to
be a model of race and gender neutrality. But apparent neutrality
is not the end of the story. Feminism teaches that oppression oper-
ates in many ways. Blatant discrimination is only one of the ways in
which race and gender privilege can be asserted. Equally harmful is
the invisibility that comes from on-going subordination; and it is
this kind of invisibility that Chamallas and Wriggins document. The
problem, they argue, is that tort law has rendered women and peo-
ple of color virtually invisible by erecting seemingly neutral barriers
against claims that reflect their particular concerns. Their argument
begins with the central question of feminist theory: Where are the
women?
The answer to this question is suggestive. In tort law, the
women are here, there, and everywhere; but they are not clustered
around traditional feminist concerns. The next logical question is:
why? If tort law is meant to redress private injuries, why is it that
common injuries incurred by subordinated groups do not provide
a basis for recovery? Why is it so difficult to press claims for: 1)
losses with respect to reproduction; 2) injuries from domestic vio-
lence; and 3) harms associated with bias and discrimination?
Whether we think of the deterrence effect of tort law or its correc-
tive justice rationale, it is hard to see why these claims should not
be certain winners. Why has tort law's commitment to these goals
so entirely failed those who are most in need of protection? Why
are recoveries in these areas sporadic at best?
There are no easy answers to these questions. There are no
ready doctrinal reforms that will improve the situation. Instead, it
is necessary to dig more deeply into the structure of tort law.
Chamallas and Wiggins argue that the above claims are generally
ruled out of court as a result of two distinctions that are generally
applied to tort claims. The first is that modern tort doctrine favors
negligence-based claims over those based on intentional conduct;
the second is that it favors physical claims over emotional ones. The
authors argue that these two preferences literally rule out of court
many of the claims that women and people of color might press.
At first blush, the explanation offered by Chamallas and Wrig-
gins may not seem obvious. Certainly, many reproductive injuries
are both physical and the result of negligence. Similarly, those who
seek to recover for domestic violence are probably more interested
in compensation for their physical injuries than for their hurt feel-
ings. Discrimination, on the other hand, frequently involves eco-
nomic harm-another category disfavored by tort law. As obvious
as these comments may seem, they are not, as the authors saliently
show in the context of tort law. Take their example: a man on horse-
back is negligent in handling his horse. As a result it rears up in front
of a pregnant woman causing her to miscarry. Surely this woman's
harm is physical rather than emotional. However, as any torts
teacher knows, such a complaint will be treated as a case of emo-
tional harm on the theory that there was an intervening emotion-
fear-that caused the physical miscarriage.
Similarly, the intentional torts vs. negligent torts dichotomy op-
erates in unexpected and ironic ways to exclude claims of sexual or
racial harassment. Under the Civil Rights Act, plaintiffs often lose
their cases because of the difficulties associated with proving that
the defendant treated them badly because of their race or gender.
They may have been yelled at, threatened, disadvantaged, and dis-
paraged, but still there is a need to prove that all of this was moti-
vated by racial or gender prejudice. Thus, the plaintiff must look to
tort law for a recovery. Because the underlying conduct is inten-
tional, the plaintiff may not appeal to the general rule of reasonable
conduct that applies to negligence cases. Instead, she is relegated
to the centuries old mechanisms of intentional torts-a landscape
that is mined with technical requirements and counterintuitive re-
sults. Furthermore, the modern remedy-Intentional Infliction of
Emotional Distress-requires a stiff showing of "extreme and out-
rageous" conduct paired with "severe" emotional harm, so that the
civil rights plaintiff ends up with an extraordinary burden that was
designed as an obstacle for those whose injuries are notably am-
biguous and amorphous.
To prove their point, Chamallas and Wriggins delve into the his-
tory of tort law and provide many examples of its inability to provide
adequate redress to women and people of color. In addition, they
document a number of other ways in which tort law engages in sub-
tle discrimination. These include:
1) The fact that tort law places a strong reliance on jury
adjudication and therefore leaves women and minority
plaintiffs vulnerable to the biases-both conscious and un-
conscious-of ordinary people.
2) The heavy emphasis on concepts of causation which in turn
are influenced by common conceptions of what is "nor-
mal" and what is out of the ordinary.
3) The fact that discrimination against women and minorities
is often hidden in evidentiary details such as actuarial
charts that "prove" that losses of earning power are more
costly for men than for women.
If you are skeptical about any of these points, I urge you to read
the book. The authors have provided countless examples and ample
proof of their claims. If, on the contrary, you are inclined to believe
these claims and deplore the fact that tort law offers inadequate
remedies for women and people of color, you too should read this
book. For you, the book will provide a glimpse of how tort law might
become a vehicle for racial and gender justice. By making an accu-
rate assessment of the problem, it provides a realistic agenda for
reform. Not surprisingly, it is not a simple agenda. It does not focus
us on changing the phrasing in one section or another of the Re-
statement. Rather it suggests that reform will only come when we
rethink some of the fundamental aspects of tort doctrine. This may
seem to be replacing a small problem of repair with a larger one of
reconstruction; but the difference is that the large ones are, as
Chamallas and Wriggins show, susceptible to evidence and argu-
ment, while the smaller ones seem to manifest the apparent in-
evitability of the way things have always been.
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Game Change is a wonderful read, but it's also useful as history
too. Through the assiduous interviews and other research con-
